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Artificial Authors: Case Studies of Copyright in Works of Machine Learning 
 
Forthcoming in Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 
Patrick R Goold 
 
Abstract 
The Article investigates whether creative works produced via machine learning 
algorithms qualify for copyright protection. Previous research into this question has 
been largely theoretical. By contrast, the Article introduces four empirical case studies 
of works produced via machine learning. The Article examines the copyrightability of 
such works under U.S., E.U., and U.K., law. The Article concludes that such works are 
sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection. This conclusion casts into doubt 
prior literature that finds works of machine learning algorithms to be outside the scope 
of copyright protection. 
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1 the Road is a novel published in July 2018.  In many respects, the book is 
unremarkable. The work appears on no best sellers’ lists.  The prose is disjointed and the text 
contains typographical errors. The story itself — a recounting of a road trip between New York 
City and New Orleans — is derivative of Jack Kerouac’s famous 1957 beat novel, On the 
Road.  But despite this, there is something unique about the work: it is the first novel written 
by a machine.1  In 2017, Ross Goodwin, technologist and data scientist from New York, 
connected a surveillance camera, a GPS unit, a microphone, and a clock to a portable laptop 
programmed with an artificial intelligence (A.I.) algorithm.2  The laptop and sensors were 
mounted to a Cadillac car, which Goodwin and friends took on a road trip from Brooklyn to 
New Orleans.3  During the trip, the sensors collected information from the outside world and 
fed it to the laptop, while the algorithm in turn created text narrating their journey.4  While 
hardly War and Peace, the resulting novel has been described as a work of “pixelated poetry” 
full of “striking and memorable lines” — such as the opening line quoted above.5  But perhaps 
the most surprising aspect of the work appears on the very first page. Before the novel’s 
opening sentence, appears a line written clearly by humans: “© Jean Boîte Éditions.”  With 
this line, the publisher claims to be the copyright owner of the work produced by the machine.  
The question is: Are they right? Are A.I.-created works copyrightable?  
 
 1 the Road is one example of the exploding field of literary and artistic works created 
via artificial intelligence.  While the use of computers to create art is itself nothing new, recent 
developments in the field of machine learning have resulted in algorithms being used to create 
works in vastly more complex, interesting, and valuable ways than ever before.  Art gallery 
Christie’s recently auctioned the “first artwork created using Artificial Intelligence” for 
$432,500,6 while a Chelsea gallery claims to have opened the first exhibition of a machine’s 
                                               
1 Thomas Horngold, The First Novel Written by AI Is Here – and It’s as Weird as You’d 
Expect It to Be, SINGULARITY HUB (Oct. 25, 2018), https://singularityhub.com/2018/10/25/ai-
wrote-a-road-trip-novel-is-it-a-good-read/#sm.00069qmis10ebdl7uan103cdtwnog.  
2 ROSS GOODWIN, 1 THE ROAD 12 (Jean Boîte Éds. 2018). 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Brian Merchant, When an AI Goes Full Jack Kerouac, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/10/automated-on-the-road/571345.  






work.7 IBM’s A.I. machine, Watson, is now capable of generating movie trailers as suspenseful 
as any created by a Hollywood scriptwriter.8  Computers can create text for sci-fi movies.9 
Musicians are releasing albums “in collaboration” with machines.10  Elon Musk-backed start-
up Open-AI recently released GPT-2 — a software that can create whole paragraphs of 
coherent prose.11 Instructional handbooks dedicated to creating works of authorship with AI 
are now appearing on the market.12   
 
 A burgeoning literature now exists concerning the copyrightability of such works.  The 
findings of this research are varied.  On one hand, an important and perhaps dominant strand 
of the literature finds that such works are generally not eligible for copyright protection under 
traditional copyright principles.  In order to be copyrightable, creative works must be sufficiently 
“original.”13 Unlike the novelty requirement in patent law, “originality” refers to a particular type 
of relationship between the person claiming authorship of the work and the work itself (e.g., in 
the U.S., that the work involve a “modicum of creativity”)14.  An important strand of the literature 
finds that, because A.I. created works lack a human “author,” the necessary “author-work” 
relationship cannot exist, and consequently such works cannot be considered original.15  In 
response, some jurisdictions have adopted bespoke legislative provisions to govern works 
created through artificial intelligence.  Since 1988, United Kingdom (U.K.) copyright legislation 
has stated that when a work has “no human author” and is “computer-generated,”16 then 
copyright in the work will vest in the person who undertook the “arrangements necessary for 
                                               
7 Ian Bogot, The AI-Art Gold Rush Is Here, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/ai-created-art-invades-chelsea-
gallery-scene/584134. 
8 Amelia Heathman, IBM Watson Creates the First AI-Made Film Trailer – And It’s 
Incredibly Creepy, WIRED (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ibm-watson-ai-
film-trailer. 
9 Annalee Newitz, Movie Written by Algorithm Turns Out to Be Hilarious And Intense, 
ARTSTECHNICA (Sept. 6, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2016/06/an-ai-wrote-this-
movie-and-its-strangely-moving. 
10 Proto HOLLY HERNDON, http://www.hollyherndon.com/proto (Proto official website). 
11 Steven Poole, The Rise of Robot Authors: Is the Writing on the Wall for Human Novelists?, 
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/mar/25/the-rise-
of-robot-authors-is-the-writing-on-the-wall-for-human-novelists. 
12 DAVID FOSTER, GENERATIVE DEEP LEARNING: TEACHING MACHINES TO PAINT, WRITE, 
COMPOSE, AND PLAY (2019). 
13 See, e.g,. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 1(a) (U.K.). 
14 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
15 See infra Part II.C. 






the creation of the work.”17  This statutory clause has been replicated in other jurisdictions, 
while commentators in the U.S. and Australia have expressed interest in the rule as a model 
for ensuring the copyrightability of such works.18  On the other hand, a smaller subset of the 
literature argues that there is no truly “computer-authored work” and that all works created via 
machine learning can be traced back to some creative input of a human author.19  To date, 
however, the legal literature on machine learning works has been purely theoretical. 
  
 This Article presents the findings of a qualitative study into works created by machine 
learning.  The Article introduces four case studies: 1 the Road (by Ross Goodwin), The 
Lifestyle of the Richard and Family (by Roslyn Helper), Edmond de Belamy (by Obvious Art), 
and I AM AI (by Tara Southern).20  The case studies were selected on the grounds that each 
involves a work of machine learning created in the past five years (and reflects the current 
state of technology); because they together comprise a broad range of artistic endeavor 
(literary works, dramatic works, artistic works, and musical works); and because the works 
were created using a broad array of machine-learning technologies.  The author used publicly 
available information about the works, and interviewed the relevant creators, in order to 
produce the case studies.  The case studies are examined through a doctrinal lens in order to 
better understand their copyrightability.  The primary research question posed is:  Are the 
works are copyrightable under traditional copyright principles?  
 
 The Article tentatively pushes back against the literature arguing that works of machine 
learning are not copyrightable.  As demonstrated below, each of the case studies involved a 
series of creative choices.  In producing the studied works, the creators made three different 
types of choices: “input” choices (about what data to feed the machine learning algorithm), 
“training” choices (about the operation of the machine learning algorithm), and “output” 
choices (about what outputs to select and how to present the outputs).21  These choices were 
frequently creative in the sense that they were aesthetic judgements unconstrained by 
utilitarian or functional concerns.  The presence of this creativity strongly suggests that the 
works are original and thus eligible for copyright protection.  In turn, the case studies suggest 
that existing legal scholarship underestimates the amount of human creativity involved in 
works of machine learning, and underestimates how frequently such works will benefit from 
copyright under traditional principles.  Of course, the study does not demonstrate that all works 
                                               
17 Id. s 9(3).  
18 See infra notes 104-105. 
19 See infra Part II.C. 
20 See infra Part III. 





produced via machine learning are eligible for copyright protection.  Works of machine learning 
are highly varied and, just like more traditional works, some will undoubtedly fail the originality 
threshold.  But it does provide some further evidence that machine-learning works, for the 
time-being, can be accommodated within the existing legal regime without the need for unique 
legal provision, like that found in the U.K 
 
The Article continues in four Parts.  Part II provides background on machine learning 
and copyright, including a literature review, and explains the methodology involved in the study 
in further depth.  Part III introduces the four case studies.  Part IV analyzes the case studies 
from a doctrinal perspective (focusing on U.S., European Union (E.U.), and U.K. law).  Part V 
concludes by comparing the findings of this study to the findings of prior research, and by 
highlighting areas for further research in the future.  Lastly, a note on terminology is required. 
The Article refers to the “creators” of the relevant case study works.  This label is used as a 
more neutral and less conclusory term than “authors.”  The term “creators” is also less 
cumbersome than other alternative terms (such as “work producers” or “users of machine 




This Part provides an overview of the topic of machine learning creativity.  After 
discussing briefly the technology required to produce machine learning works, the Part 
summarizes U.S., E.U., and U.K. law on copyrightability.  The Part proceeds to provide a 
review of the literature on the topic before finally explaining the methodology adopted in this 
Article.  
 
A. Machine Learning Creativity 
The use of computers to create expressive works is far from new.  The term “computer 
art” was coined in the early nineteen sixties to refer to works created through use of a 
computer.22  Arguably the first artist in this genre was Manchester University philosophy 
lecturer, Desmond Paul Henry, who created the “Henry Drawing Machine.”23  This “analogue” 
computer employed an external electric power source which operated a motor to turn 
suspended drawing implements over canvas.  Henry’s work was exhibited in 1962 in the Reid 
                                               
22 Edmund Berkley, Readers’ and Editors Forum, 22 COMPUTERS & AUTOMATION 8 (1963), 
http://www.bitsavers.org/pdf/computersAndAutomation/196301.pdf (the front cover and the editor’s 
explanation is typically seen as the coining of the phrase “computer art”).  
23 Alice Rawsthorn, When Desmond Paul Henry Traded His Pen for a Machine, NEW YORK TIMES 





Gallery in London.24  But digital computer art was quick to follow.  In 1962, A. Michael Noll 
programmed computers at Bell Telephone Laboratories in New Jersey to create visual 
patterns for aesthetic purposes.25  By 1968, enough computer art existed to enable London’s 
Institute of Contemporary Arts to host an exhibit called “Cybernetic Serendipity,” featuring 
works from the first generation of digital artists, such as Nam Jun Paik, John Whitney, and 
Charles Csuri.26  This trend in art, in turn, began to have an effect in copyright. In his Annual 
Report of 1965, Abraham Kaminstein, U.S. Register of Copyrights, wrote that the U.S. 
Copyright Office had received several applications which are “at least partly” the work of 
computers (and he listed an abstract drawing, a musical composition, and several 
compilations as examples).27  Despite the historical pedigree of computer art, advancements 
in machine learning in recent years have had a profound impact on the genre. 
 
“Machine Learning” (a flourishing subset of artificial intelligence) refers to the study of 
algorithms used to perform a task but without using explicit instructions.28  Arthur Samuel in 
1959 defined machine learning as the field of study that “gives computers the ability to learn 
without being explicitly programmed.”29  For example, a machine learning algorithm may be 
shown a symbol (e.g. the number “3”) and be able to recognize what that symbol means (that 
the symbol “3” means “three” in the Hindu-Arabic numeral system) without explicitly being told. 
Or the machine may be given an image of a skin mole and the algorithm can accurately classify 
it as benign or malignant.30  To make such predictions, the algorithm must first be “trained” on 
a sample of “training data.”31 Through the training process, the algorithm builds a statistical 
model which forms the basis of the decision making process.32  There are a number of ways 
                                               
24 Eric Newton, Ideographs at the Reid Gallery,  MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Aug. 31, 1962. 
25 Michael A. Noll, Computers and the Visual Arts, in, DESIGN AND PLANNING 2: COMPUTERS IN 
DESIGN AND COMMUNICATION 65-79 (Martin Krampen & Peter Seitz eds., 1967). 
26 Cybernetic Serendipity: A Documentation, INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY ART, 
https://archive.ica.art/whats-on/cybernetic-serendipity-documentation (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). 
27 UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFF., SIXTY-EIGHT ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1965, at 5 (1966). 
28 For a general introduction to the technical workings of machine learning, see GOPINATH REBALA ET 
AL, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE LEARNING 1-5 (2019).  For introduction to the interaction of AI with 
the law, see RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Woodrow Barfield 
& Ugo Pagallo eds, 2018). 
29 Arthur L. Samuel, Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers, 3 IBM J. RES. 
DEVELOP. 210 1959).  More recently Tom Mitchell provided a more modern definition: “A computer 
program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some task T and some performance 
measure P, if its performance on T, as measured by P, improves with experience E.” THOMAS 
MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING 2 (1997).  
30 Andre Esteva and Eric Topol, Can Skin Cancer Diagnosis Be Transformed by AI?, LANCET 
PERSPECTIVES (Nov.16, 2019), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(19)32726-6/fulltext.  
31 Rebala, supra note 28, at 19-22. 





in which this training or learning process takes place, but the two most commonly discussed 
are “supervised” and “unsupervised” learning.33  In the former, the algorithm is given both 
inputs and outputs. For example, a computer may be shown hundreds of thousands of 
numbers (“inputs”) alongside labels stating what those symbols mean (“outputs”).  The training 
data demonstrates that the symbol 3 (input) means “three” (the output). From this data, the 
algorithm builds a statistical model, so that in the future if it is shown a new input (e.g. a symbol 
3 in a different font or handwriting), it will be able to accurately predict the output on its own 
(i.e. that the relevant symbol means “three”).  Alternatively, in “unsupervised learning” the 
machine is only given inputs (and no outputs.) From this data, the machine identifies patterns 
in the data (perhaps even patterns humans would not detect), which are then used as the 
basis of future predictions.  
 
Machine learning typically (although not exclusively) involves a specific class of 
algorithm called “neural networks” (or “artificial neural networks”).  These algorithms inspired 
by the biological neural networks in the human brain were initially created by computer 
scientists trying to perform tasks with which conventional algorithms had little success34.  Such 
algorithms are composed of a series of interconnected units (“nodes”) which can send signals 
back and forth. The most recent, and to date most important development within this field, was 
the creation of the “Generative Adversarial Network” (GAN) by Ian Goodfellow in 2014.35  The 
GAN is composed of two artificial neural networks — a “generative network” and a 
“discriminator network.”36 These two networks compete with each other in a game.  Let us say 
the task of the network is to produce realistic photographs of humans.  Both networks are 
given a set of training data (pictures of real humans).  The task of the generative network is to 
create new pictures of humans.   The discriminator network reviews the outputs of the 
generative network, and assesses whether this is output is a real human (i.e., a picture from 
the initial data), or a forgery (i.e. a creation of the generative network).  The game is completed 
when the generative network can produce outputs that are good enough to fool the 
discriminator network (i.e., generate pictures which the discriminator believes to be part of the 
original training data).37  At this point, the network can then be used to produce thousands of 
new photos.  
 
                                               
33 Other types of learning algorithm (e.g., reinforcement learning, self-learning, feature learning) can 
be glossed over at this point.  Rebala, supra note 28, at 22. 
34 Rebala supra note 28, 105-06. 
35 Ian Goodfellow et al, Generative Adversarial Nets, PROC. INT’L CONFERENCE ON NEURAL INFO. 
PROCESSING SYS. 2672 (2014).  
36 Id.   





By training neural network on creative works, an algorithm can learn the features of 
those works and produce works in a similar style.38  The first known example of such “style 
transfer” occurred in 1989 when Peter Todd trained neural networks to reproduce musical 
melodies, and by changing the network’s parameters slightly, was able to generate new 
music.39  But a more recent example can be found in Google’s Deep Dream Generator.40  By 
training the algorithm on styles of painting, the algorithm can take a user-uploaded photograph 
and reimagine how it would look like in a given style (see figure 1 for example).  Or, as we 
shall see with the 1 the Road example, Goodwin was able to train the algorithm on a range of 
literary works, such that when the algorithm was fed with information from the various sensors, 
the machine was able to construct those raw inputs into prose in the same style as the training 
data.  Today, with the backing of Google,41 Elon Musk,42 and with a range of online tools 
teaching artists how to use neural networks, we have witnessed a “Gold Rush” to make 
advancements in the field of AI creativity.43  
 
 
Figure 1: Deep Dream44 
B. The Law of Copyrightability 
Copyright in the United States exists in “original works of authorship” fixed in a tangible 
medium.45  Whether a work is “original” depends on its ability to meet the test laid down in 
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service.46  Prior to Feist, the prevailing originality 
                                               
38 Foster, supra note 12, at 153-54. 
39 Peter M. Todd, A Connectionist Approach to Algorithmic Composition, 13 COMPUTER MUSIC J. 27 
(1989).  
40 DEEP DREAM GENERATOR, https://deepdreamgenerator.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). 
41 ARTISTS AND MACHINE INTELLIGENCE, https://ami.withgoogle.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). 
42 OPENAI, https://openai.com,  (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). 
43 Bogot, supra note 7. 
44 Content image: The Tübingen Neckarfront by Andreas Praefcke, Style painting: “Head of a 
Clown”, by Georges Rouault. Combined image taken from Vincent Dumoulin et al, Supercharging 
Style Transfer, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Oct. 26, 2016), https://ai.googleblog.com/2016/10/supercharging-
style-transfer.html.  
45 17. U.S.C. § 102(a). 





standard was the “Sweat of the Brow” test, under which copyright would be acquired if 
sufficient labor was involved in the work’s creation.  According to the new standard in Feist, a 
work will be original if its generation involved a “modicum of creativity.”47 While the standard 
of creativity is “extremely low”48 according to the Supreme Court, there must nevertheless be 
a “spark”49 or “minimal degree”50 of creativity in order to be protected.  The creativity 
requirement is “objective” in the sense that the artistic merit or worth of the work is not 
important;51 the only requirement is that the author makes aesthetic choices unconstrained by 
functional or utilitarian concerns.52  
  
U.S. courts have not provided a definition of the term “authorship.”53 Rather than 
provide a separate “authorship” standard, “originality” generally provides the focus for judicial 
analysis. Rather than existing as two analytically distinct concepts, originality and authorship 
are, in current doctrine, intractably fused (or perhaps confused),54 to the point that some 
courts, arguably, view “authorship” as a label attached to anyone who supplies “originality.” In 
response, some scholars have tried to deduce principles of authorship from existing law55 or 
simply proposed a new authorship standard.56 These principles have not, as of yet, been 
clearly endorsed by courts. Nevertheless, assuming a work is protected by copyright, then the 
                                               
47 Id.  
48 Id., at 343. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
52 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U,S, 201 (1954). 
53 Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1063, 1066 (2003) (“Few judicial decisions address what authorship means, or who is an author.”); 
Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1231-32 (2016) 
(arguing that copyright doctrine requires that a work be original, creative, and fixed to be protected by 
U.S. copyright law, but that this needs to be supported by a separate concept of authorship, which has 
so far not been articulated).  Although philosophers and historians have paid more attention to the 
concept of authorship.  See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
“Authorship”, DUKE L.J. 455 (1991); Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, 
Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008).  
54 As an illustration of this fusing, see David Nimmer, Copyright in The Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship 
and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (where the section “In pursuit of the Originator” identifies 
the author as the person to whom the work owes its “origin”).  See also 2 WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT § 5:14 (2020) (writing that “Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. … 
grounded authorship in the constitutional requirement of originality…”).  
55  Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, Authors and Machines, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
343, 347 (2019) (deriving “general principles of authorship from copyright cases;” the 
general principles requiring a detailed conception of the work and a physical execution of the 
work).  
56 Buccafusco, supra note 53 (proposing an authorship standard whereby the putative author 





initial ownership of the work will be allocated to the “author.”57  
 
In this study, the potentially difficult issue of “derivative works” will be largely bracketed.  
The U.S. Copyright Act defines a derivative work as a “work based upon one or more pre-
existing works.”58  To the extent that a work is derivative, it cannot be considered an original 
work.59  Furthermore, a copyright owner has the right to prevent the creation of unauthorized 
derivative works.60  Lawyers have not reached consensus regarding the scope of this 
provision, and one treatise finds the case law on the topic to be “fast approaching 
incomprehensibility.”61 Nevertheless, it is clear that works based on pre-existing ideas are not 
derivative works, and nor are works that “incorporate insubstantial amounts from pre-existing 
works.”62  This provision suggests an important question: by training an algorithm on pre-
existing copyrighted works, and by using that trained algorithm to create a new work, does the 
operator of the algorithm create an unlawful derivative work which, to the extent it is derivative, 
cannot be considered original?   This Article largely does not answer this question. It assumes 
that the case studies are not derivative of any pre-existing works, and ergo are all capable of 
being original works.  This decision is made for a number of reasons.  Partly, this is because 
the author does not have access to the entirety of the works upon which the machine learning 
algorithms were trained, and is thus in no position to analyze whether the resulting works are 
derivative.  Partly it is because, in the author’s estimation, the case studied works are likely 
not to be considered derivative and, on the balance of probabilities, they involve insubstantial 
incorporation of prior expression.  But most significantly of all, engaging in this question would 
not clearly serve the research aims. Examining whether the works are derivative, in a legal 
sense, does not shed light on whether the production process behind the case studies and 
whether that involved creative choices.  Our study can analyze whether the case studied works 
involved creative choices or not without wading into the legally complex territory of derivative 
works. 
 
In order to be an original copyrightable work in the E.U., the work must be the “author’s 
own intellectual creation.”  This test was laid down in the Court of Justice of the European 
                                               
57 17 U.S.C. § 201 
58 17. U.S.C. § 101 (derivative work definition). 
59 See Gracen v. Bradford Exch. & MGM, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that the 
plaintiff’s work — a painting based on Judie Garland in the Wizard of Oz — was derivative 
of the MGM movie and thus not original and copyrightable). 
60 17. U.S.C. § 106(2). 
61 2 PATRY, supra note 54, § 3:46. 





Union (C.J.E.U.) Infopaq case.63  Subsequent courts have further elaborated that, in order to 
be the author’s own intellectual creation, the work must involve the “personal touch”64 of the 
author, and must result from the author’s “free and creative choices.”65  Furthermore, in Painer, 
Advocate-General Trstenjak wrote that “only human creations are … protected,”66 although 
admitting that this included cases where a human “employs a technical aid, such as a 
camera.”67 The references to “intellectual creation” and “personal touch” might suggest a 
higher threshold of originality than in the U.S.  However, this is not an inevitable conclusion.  
The C.J.E.U. has not explicitly stated how difficult the standard is to achieve (unlike the U.S. 
Supreme Court which has stated the threshold is “extremely low”).  Furthermore, certain 
decisions suggest the level of creativity is not significant.  For example, in Infopaq, the C.J.E.U. 
agreed that a string of eleven words could be sufficiently original to receive copyright 
protection. Lastly, E.U. law, even more noticeably than U.S. law, ties together the concepts of 
authorship and originality by including the former concept within the definition of the latter. 
 
As part of the E.U. for many decades, the U.K. also follows the E.U. “intellectual 
creation” standard.68  However, U.K. copyright law departs from E.U. in one very significant, 
and one moderately significant, way.  First, U.K. law has, since 1988, adopted a unique 
provision relating to “computer-generated works.” In cases where there is “no human author” 
and works are instead “computer-generated,”69 the statute states that the “author shall be 
taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are 
undertaken”70 (this provision has subsequently been adopted in Ireland71 and New Zealand72).  
To date, courts have only applied the section once (and, even then, the court did not spend 
significant time interpreting the provision). In Nova Productions Ltd v. Mazooma Games Ltd & 
Ors, it was held that the visual display produced on screen by an arcade game was a graphic 
work created by the programmers of the game, rather than the users of the game.73  L.J. Jacob 
supported this conclusion on the grounds that the user’s contribution was not “artistic in nature” 
(it involved no “skill or labour of an artistic kind”) and that the user had not “undertaken any of 
                                               
63 Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, [2009] ECR I-6569 (E.U.). 
64 Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH, [2012] ECDR 6 (E.U.). 
65 Id.  
66 Eva-Maria Painer n.71; Opinion of AG Trstenjak para 121 (E.U.). 
67 Id.  
68 Temple Island Collection v. New English Teas, [2011] EWPCC 1 (U.K.). 
69 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 178 (U.K.). 
70 Id. s 9(3). 
71 Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 s 21(f) (Ire.). 
72 Copyright Act 1994 s 5(2)(a) (N.Z.). 





the arrangements necessary for the creation of the frame images.”74  Although questions 
regarding who has undertaken the necessary arrangements for a work’s generation (the 
programmer or user of an algorithm) persist,75 it is interesting to note that L.J. Jacob tied the 
concept of “arrangements” to the originality standard (i.e. skill and labour of an artistic kind).  
The statute does make clear, however, that, whoever has made the necessary “arrangements” 
will receive economic rights only, and does not receive moral rights protection.76  Second, until 
the 2009 C.J.E.U. Infopaq decision, the U.K. followed an alternative originality standard. 
Historically, a work would be considered “original” if the putative owner produced the work 
through the application of “skill, labor, and judgement”77 (sometimes “skill, labor, or 
judgment”78 and at times just “skill and labor”79).  This standard was traditionally easy to satisfy, 
as demonstrated by famous case law holding that the addition of punctuation, corrections and 
revisions to public speeches was a sufficiently original contribution to give rise to a 
copyrightable work. 80 Prior to the U.K.’s departure from the E.U., debate existed concerning 
how significantly the copyrightability test in the U.K. was altered by Infopaq, with some courts 
finding the two tests to be largely equivalent.81  
 
Lastly, in none of the above jurisdiction exists a formal “causal” connection 
requirement. In non-digital environments, the causal connection between an author and her 
work is typically straightforward.  A painter causes the production of the work through 
application of paint to canvas, for example.  A defining feature of works of machine learning is 
that the connection between the author and the work may be slightly more attenuated.  The 
presence of an algorithm between the author and the ultimate work complicates the causal 
relationship.82  In part, this is due to the unpredictability of the algorithm. While the author may 
train the algorithm in a certain way, there will nevertheless be some uncertainty ex ante about 
the outputs it creates.  Unlike the painter example, the creator potentially does not have full 
control over the resulting output. This is, of course, not entirely a feature of machine learning 
works. Cases like the infamous Monkey Selfie case (where a photographer left a camera with 
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a group of macaque monkeys, one of whom used it to take a selfie), posed similar difficulties.83  
In cases where the relationship between putative author and resulting work become more 
tenuous, questions of authorship naturally arise. In response, some scholars have suggested 
that copyright adopt a more explicit “causal” connection requirement.84  However, to date, such 
a requirement has not been endorsed by courts or legislatures.  The only requirement for 
copyrightability is that a work be an original work of authorship (with originality, rather than 
authorship, playing a more dominant conceptual role).  
 
C. Literature Review 
U.S. scholars have considered the copyrightability of A.I. produced work from a 
doctrinal perspective. The conclusions have, however, been varied.  In one of the earliest 
assessments of copyright in works produced by neural networks, Ralph Clifford argued that in 
order to be protected, an expressive work must involve human-supplied originality.85  As many 
computer-generated works do not involve such originality, then the work “presumably enters 
the public domain.”86  This view has been adopted by the U.S. Copyright Office that currently 
requires works to be “created by a human being” in order to be registered in the Copyright 
Register.87 Finding that such works are not protected by existing copyright law, some scholars 
propose law reform. Bruce Boydon, for example, proposes a new “test” for copyrightability in 
relation to such works.88  Boydon argues that if a “person could predict the work’s content with 
reasonable specificity before it is rendered or received by the user” then it that person ought 
to enjoy copyright in the work.89  In a related vein, Peter Denicola challenges the Copyright 
Office’s human-authorship requirement on normative grounds, who argues that incentivizing 
the creation of new works should include incentivizing the creation of machine-authored works 
as well.90 
 
However, not all scholars have concluded that such works are not protected under 
existing U.S. copyright law.  In particular, Annemarie Bridy cites cases involving psychography 
(i.e. a psychic ability to allow a spirit to use one’s body to write words) for the claim that human 
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authorship is not necessary for creation.91  Following these cases, Bridy argues that U.S. 
copyright does not require human creativity, so long as there is a sufficient “nexus” to human 
creativity,92 which A.I. produced works may satisfy.  This view is echoed by James 
Grimmelmann who has argued that there is “no such thing as a computer-authored work.”93  
Although Grimmelmann agrees that computer-generated works exist, a number of factors 
prevent these from being considered as “authored” by the computer (e.g. “programmers as 
well as users contribute to them”) and instead they are more accurately understood as 
authored by humans.94  But the most recent, and perhaps most significant, expositors of this 
view are Jane Ginsburg and Luke Ali Budiardjo.  Ginsburg and Budiardjo claim that even “the 
most technologically advanced machines of our era are little more than faithful agents of the 
humans who design or use them”95 because all outputs of a machine can ultimately be traced 
back to the instructions provided by humans. Accordingly, these scholars claim that “can a 
machine be an author?” is the “wrong” question, while the more “appropriate” or pressing 
question is to which human ought authorship be attributed, particularly in cases where multiple 
individuals (upstream programmers and downstream users of machines) together contribute 
to the ultimate creation of a work (a question which, as we shall see, has particular relevance 
in the U.K.).96  
 
E.U. focused literature is less developed than U.S. literature. But at this stage, scholars 
have largely concluded that under the Infopaq standard, copyright would not be obtained.  Ana 
Ramalho finds that the references to “personality” in E.U. law “seem to highlight the need for 
a human author of the work.”97  Likewise, Andres Guadamuz writes that it is “inescapable to 
conclude that not only does the author need to be human, the copyright work must reflect the 
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author’s personality.”98  Finally, Pinto concludes that when there is no human author, then 
“there will be no copyright under the E.U. originality test.”99  Nevertheless, these authors do 
not consider in significant detail exactly how much human involvement would be required in a 
work’s creation, in order for the work to be considered “human-authored.” 
 
By virtue of the unique computer-generated works clause, U.K. law is in a distinct 
position from both U.S. and E.U. law.  Guadamuz calls the law “deceptively straightforward.”100 
Guadamuz understands the U.K.’s computer-generated works clause as an “exception” to the 
originality principle.101  Accordingly, computer-generated works are protected, somewhat 
clearly, under U.K. law, although questions remain about in whom the copyright vests (the 
programmer or the user of a program).102  Commentators have largely praised this provision 
on the ground that it simplifies and clarifies the copyright status of such works.  Guadamuz, 
for example, suggests that the U.K. provision should be “adopted more widely.”103  
Commentators outside the U.K., in both the U.S.104 and Australia105 have expressed interest 
in adopting a similar model of protection.  
 
Prior literature is similar in two important respects.  The above literature provides a 
theoretical-doctrinal analysis of the issue of works of machine learning. The prior literature is 
doctrinal in the sense that it makes claims about the application of law to the phenomenon of 
machine learning works (although significant differences exist in the methodological 
assumptions underlying the authors’ doctrinal analyses).  Furthermore, the literature is purely 
theoretical.  The works are not “empirical” in the sense that they involve no substantial new 
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data-gathering.106 Instead, prior research relies exclusively on reported legal cases as the 
subject of analysis.  This method is the usual starting point in legal research, but yet, has clear 
limitations. It is difficult to judge the copyrightability of machine-learning works using this 
methodology when no real world controversies have come before the courts.  As a result, the 
prior studies are necessarily speculative.  Without a set of works produced by machine 
learning to examine in detail, the research attempts to apply copyright principles to a 
somewhat abstract notion of machine learning works.   
 
In contrast to prior literature, the present Article is empirical and doctrinal.  As with prior 
literature, the aim is to make claims about how the law applies in cases of machine learning.  
But compared to prior literature, the current Article does not examine exclusively reported legal 
cases. Instead, the current research selected four works of machine learning and investigated 
the production process involved in each work.  Like the prior literature, the current Article 
analyzes how copyright law applies in these cases. But unlike prior literature, by examining 
four case studies, this research is less abstract, provides more opportunities for depth of 
analysis, and may yield more concrete conclusions.  By adopting the case study method, this 
Article is more akin to the type of scenario faced by judges in real world litigation.  This study, 




The case studies were selected by the author in the following manner.  First, the study 
sought to identify one literary work (a.k.a. one non-dramatic literary work), one artistic work, 
one dramatic work (a.k.a. one dramatic literary work), and one musical work.  These four types 
of creative works represent, in many jurisdictions, the most recognizable and significant sub-
types of copyrightable subject matter.107  Second, to be part of the study, the works had to be 
produced in the last five years (i.e., from January 2015 to January 2020).  This ensured that 
the case studies accurately represent the current state of technology. Similarly, the author 
wished to study works which were created through a diverse range of technologies (as 
opposed to four works created using the same or similar machine learning algorithms).  
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A preliminary list of candidate works was formed using Google search engine.  The 
author identified possible candidates by searching for “creative works” produced by machine 
learning.  The author reached out to possible candidates with a request for interview.  The 
request and accompanying participant information document made clear that no 
compensation was offered for taking part in the study and that the study would analyze the 
copyrightability of the relevant works.  The use of Google to find the participants has clear 
advantages and disadvantages. The use of Google was advantageous in the following ways: 
the author could identify works which had received news attention for breaking new ground in 
the field of A.I. and creativity, and the author could identify creators from a very wide range of 
geographical locations.  A feature of this process (which may be an advantage or a 
disadvantage), was the study focused on works which are traditionally associated with 
creativity.  For example, if one uses Google to search for “machine learning and creativity,” it 
is likely that works like 1 the Road would appear in the search terms, but it is less likely that 
the search terms would provide information about an individual using a pre-trained algorithm 
to translate C.J.E.U. court decisions.  Similarly, a potential drawback of the Google method is 
that the author’s preliminary list of potential candidates primarily consisted of individuals who 
already conceived of their work as “artistic” or “creative.”  
 
With one notable exception, the author proceeded to interview the study participants. In 
the case of 1 The Road, The Lifestyle of the Richard and Family, and Edmond de Belamy, the 
author conducted a one-hour semi-structured interview using Skype or Zoom.  In the case of 
Edmond de Belamy, the study interviewed only one of the three creators of the work (who was 
designated by the group to conduct the interview).  The conversations were transcribed and 
subject to classical content analysis (seeking to organically identify common themes in the 
materials).108 This material was supplemented by information made publicly available online 
by the relevant creator.  While this methodology was proposed in relation to the fourth case 
study, I AM AI, personal circumstances of the participant ultimately prevented its execution.  
In this case study, the creator of the work instead provided answers to written questions.  The 
written answers were subject to the same content analysis as the three other case studies.  
While this concededly means that the four case studies were not subject to precisely the same 
method of data collection, the impact of this difference is limited in the context of this study.  
The study does not necessarily seek to draw comparisons between the case studies, and 
accordingly, the need for ensuring consistency of data-gathering method is less significant.  
The overriding methodological requirement is that each participant provide a faithful account 
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of the production process for their works which can then be subject to doctrinal analysis.  This 
goal could be accomplished by either oral or written answers to questions.  
 
In Part IV the case studies are subject to doctrinal analysis. Doctrinal analysis is a 
contested field. Disagreement exists about, in particular, the nature and sources of law. While 
Positivists argue that law is social fact and a product of socially produced rules,109  
Interpretivists and Natural Law scholars see morality as a free-standing source of law.110  
Besides the question of the nature and sources of law, further disagreement exists regarding 
the ability of those sources to provide a determinate answer in concrete cases.  While ardent 
Formalists argue that law always, or nearly always, yields a unique answer,111  Legal Realists 
argue that law is inherently indeterminate and accordingly, in all but the easiest cases, how 
law applies to concrete scenarios is affected by non-legal factors (including ideology and 
personality).112  While not wading into this methodological debate, the analysis provided in 
Part IV may be understood as Positivist and moderately-Realist.113  That is, the “law” which it 
seeks to apply to the cases is that which has been clearly elucidated by legislature and courts 
(morality is not considered).  Furthermore, while acknowledging a role for discretion in the 
application of law, particularly in hard cases, the analysis assumes legal rules have some 
determinate application.  On this basis, we can make reasonable predictions about the 
likelihood that a court will find a given work will be protected by copyright or not.   
 
III. CASE STUDIES 
 
This Part introduces the case studies and summarizes the main themes that emerged 
from the interviews and content analysis.  While this Part does not engage in a doctrinal 
analysis of the case studies, it does highlight information which will be salient to such analysis 
later.  
 
A. 1 the Road 
1 the Road began life when Ross Goodwin was writing his master’s thesis at New York 
University.114  An economist by training, and a previous speech writer for the Obama 
campaign, Goodwin turned his attention to machine learning and creativity.   His master’s 
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thesis, entitled Narrated Reality involved Goodwin walking around New York City with a 
backpack, containing a compass, a punch clock, and a camera.115   These sensors fed inputs 
to an algorithm made up of “Long Short Term Memory Neural Networks.”116   The algorithm 
then produced “weird associative poetry” as an output.117  While completing his master’s 
thesis, Goodwin began to toy with the idea of whether a car could write a novel.118  Could a 
car, for example, write a pastiche of Jack Kerouac’s On the Road? The success of the master’s 
thesis attracted the interest of Google’s Artists and Machine Intelligence Project, who 
sponsored his next endeavor, 1 the Road.119  
 
Goodwin used the same algorithm to create 1 the Road as was previously used in 
relation to Narrated Reality.  Over the course of a year, Goodwin trained the algorithm on a 
new data set.  Although the goal was to write a novel that paid homage to Kerouac, Goodwin 
decided against training the machine on Kerouac’s work or even other beatnik authors, as 
being “too on the nose.”120  Instead Goodwin’s training data was a mix of poetry, science 
fiction, and “bleak” writing.121 The “bleak” writing in particular came from a list of book 
recommendations by a Polish painter that Goodwin admired122 (Goodwin says he wanted the 
book to have “the brain of a painter”123).  In total, the algorithm was given twenty million words 
to train upon.124  Together, this training data “represented the voice [Goodwin] wanted the 
book to be written in”;125 it was “one that [Goodwin] thought would match the terrain of the 
journey, its historical and literary significance.”126  During this time, Goodwin tested the 
algorithm’s outputs in two ways. First, the text which was produced was assessed qualitatively 
by Goodwin on a micro-level, determining whether the text was “good.”127  In addition, 
Goodwin used a statistical method of testing the outputs.128  Prior to training, a portion of the 
training data was set aside as “validation data.”  Goodwin then statistically tested the variation 
between the outputs and this validation data to determine the similarity of outputs.129  
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 Once the training was complete, the next stage was more mechanical. The car needed 
to be fitted with the four sensors: a GPS unit to track the car’s location; an internal clock to tell 
the time and date; a surveillance camera mounted on the trunk to monitor passing scenery; 
and a microphone picking up conversations inside the car.  Goodwin then devised a 1,000 
mile route which would take the car from Brooklyn to New Orleans.  The exact route taken in 
On the Road could not be replicated due to changes in the interstate highway system since 
its publication in 1957.130  Planning the route also involved selecting appropriate stopping 
points along the way. All of which had to be considered carefully, as this may affect the output 
of the machine.  To illustrate, one of the stop off point along the route was at a house which 
was said to be haunted, to see what the algorithm would make of the unusual location.131 
 
Figure 2: Goodwin Preparing132 
 The journey took place over four days.  The opening line (“It was nine seventeen in the 
morning, and the house was heavy”) was created before the car had left its starting point in 
Brooklyn. In this instance, the clock registered the time, which sent the data to the algorithm, 
which then produced this output.  Along the journey, the algorithm turned various inputs into 
output text.  The GPS unit caught latitude and longitude coordinates (e.g. “35.415579526 N, -
77.999721808 W, at 154.68504432 feet above sea level, at 0.0 miles per hour, and the first 
flat of the story in the country is the first in part of the world”133), the surveillance camera caught 
images (e.g., “A ski tree in the background was silent and soft and melancholy”134), and the 
microphone picked up on the passenger’s conversation (e.g., “I somewhat when i’m on why i 
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didn’t get hurt yeah my car is an every down i know?”135). After which the outputs were printed 
on rolls of receipt paper.  The resulting product is illustrated in figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: A page from 1 the Road 
B. The Lifestyle of the Richard and Family 
The Lifestyle of the Richard and Family is a dramatic work intended for the stage. 
Creator, Roslyn Helper describes the play as “your classic dinner party setup that slowly 
deteriorates into a very abstract kind of farse.”136  The play involves five characters: Maree, 
David Jones, Jimmy, Sarah and Clare Martin.  The dinner play starts out as a dinner party but 
descends into a “tech rave apocalypse.”137  The characters have clear personas (David Jones 
has a job and a gym membership and having an affair with Clare Martin, while Maree likes 
online shopping and has a drinking problem),138 and the work primarily consists of dialogue 
between the characters.  Figure 4 below shows an extract of the dialogue.  
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Figure 4: Section of The Lifestyle.  
 
The work was created by Roslyn Helper “in collaboration with Swiftkey Note.”139 
Swiftkey Note (now known as Swiftkey) is an application for Android and iOS cellphones 
owned by Microsoft.140 The application consists of a keyboard which enables the user to type 
text (whether that is a text message, an email, or a document).  As the user types, the 
application analyzes the language patterns of the user. After learning the language of the user, 
the keyboard makes predictions about word choice.  When a user begins typing, the 
application will predict what word should come next.  The application provides a choice of 
three words that may come next (see Figure 5).  By selecting one of the words from the option, 
the user saves time that otherwise would be spent typing.  What distinguishes Swiftkey from 
competitor applications (such as a standard iOS keyboard) is its use of neural networks.141  
The incorporation of machine learning allows the application to provide better predictive text.  
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Figure 5: Swiftkey interface142   
 
Roslyn Helper is a Melbourne based artist.  She has a background in communications, 
government and international relations, rather than in technology.143  Helper’s art examines 
“modes of communication in a heavily mediated society” and “the way that we are making 
meaning through new platforms.”144  Previous works include the Human Google Project — a 
solo durational performance work here Helper attempts to take on the role of Google Search 
Engine.145 
 
After downloading Swiftkey, Helper began “playing around” with the technology in what 
she describes an “exploratory phase.”146  During this phase, Helper used the application to 
send text messages to herself and to write poetry pieces.  At a certain point in time, Helper 
began to turn her attention to writing a full-length work with Swiftkey.  By this point, the 
application had begun to understand Helper’s language patterns.  Over the course of a “couple 
of months” Helper worked on the script.147  This work was not “full time” but largely performed 
on days “here and there” when other commitments permitted.148  
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Helper began with the idea of a dinner party with five participants.149  But other than 
that, Helper explains that she had no “macro” narrative in mind for the play.150  She did not, 
for example, set out with the plan regarding how the script would start and end. Nor did she 
select the names of the characters or their character traits (the name David Jones is for 
example the name of a well-known retail chain in Australia and was suggested by the 
application).151  These features emerged as Helper and the application created the dialogue.  
To create the dialogue, Helper would start with an idea for a sentence.  For example, Helper 
may start out with the idea for a sentence such as “Hello, David.” Helper would then type the 
first letter — “H” — and then the application would give her three options to choose from, for 
example “hope,” “happy” and “hopefully.”  This list may or may not include the initial word that 
Helper had envisioned. Thereafter, Helper would select a word from the menu and move on 
to repeat the process with the next word. The word selection process was largely an organic 
and intuitive one.  Rather than making thoughtful decisions regarding each word, Helper 
describes the process as “vibing it.”152  Lastly, one interesting part of the work was not written 
by Helper, but a friend, also using Swiftkey.  As an experiment, Helper asked her friend to 
write some text for the play using Swiftkey trained on the friend’s language patterns.  Helper 
describes the friend’s personality and character as “more out there” than herself, and that this 
translated into text which was more abstract and sexualized (with references to BDSM etc.).153 
 
After the text was created, the work underwent a significant “editing” period.154  Helper 
explains that the material which was created during the work’s production was “far greater” 
than that which ended up in the final script.155  The work underwent a process of “editing down” 
where Helper consciously considered “what made sense and what fits.”156 In particular this 
involved substituting sentences or chunks of text. This process was undertaken in order to 
create a “sense of narrative.”157  Helper explains that this narrative was, in this sense, 
“designed by me” but that it was a “retroactive” process.158 
 
C. Edmond de Belamy 















Obvious Art is a collective of three French machine learning artists: Hugo Caselles-
Dupre, Gauthier Vernier, and Pierre Fautrel.159  Their goal is to “explore, use, and share the 
different ways machine learning algorithms can catalyze our natural creativity.”160  Each of the 
trio is involved in the production process and play a role in selecting works to produce. This 
study interviewed Pierre Fautrel only as Fautrel normally handles media inquiries into their 
works.   
Obvious made headlines in 2018 when Christie’s auctioned one of their A.I.s-created 
portraits, Edmond de Belamy.161 The painting, shown in figure 6, is a portrait of a man printed 
on canvas.  In the bottom right hand corner, the work is “signed” with a line of code (‘minG  
maxD Ex  [log (D(x))] + Ez  [log(1 – D(G(z)))]’) — a reference to part of the algorithm that helped 
created the piece.   Christie’s publicized this as the first artwork created by artificial intelligence.  
The work sold for a substantial $432,500 (far above the pre-action estimates of $7,000 to 
$10,000).162 This work forms part of a series of works called La Famille de Belamy. 
 
 
Figure 6: Edmond de Belamy 
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 In order to create a work such as Edmond, Obvious begins by selecting a subject.163  
In the case of La Famille de Belamy, the subject was classical portraiture (more recent projects 
have included Japanese woodblock prints).164  The trio explain their process of selecting a 
subject in the following way: “[w]e tend to focus on something that speaks to us, that is iconic 
in our society, and more importantly, that we like.”165  
 
Once a subject has been chosen, the collective starts collecting a database of pre-
existing works of the subject.166  This involves collecting tens of thousands of images.167 Once 
the database is collected, it must be cleansed.168  It is likely that some of the images in the 
initial database were “false positives” and included in the database by error.  Perhaps a 
photograph has made its way into the database, or perhaps one image contains multiple 
people rather than just one.169  These must be removed before the algorithm can be set to 
work training on the database. In order to make Edmond de Belamy,  Obvious started with 
20,000 portraits, and manually (i.e. sitting in front of the screen viewing each portrait 
individually) reduced that dataset to 14,000.170  Later projects have involved even larger data 
gathering and cleaning efforts, such as the Japanese woodblock print series which started 
from 200,000 initial entries, paired down eventually to 30,000.171  
 
Once the training process begins, Obvious must check the quality of the outputs 
produced by the algorithm.172  This is largely a trial and error process, with the algorithm 
producing outputs and the operators checking whether the resulting outputs are “good” from 
an artistic point of view.173  Pierre Fautrel analogizes the training process to a painter in front 
of a canvas: the collective check the outputs, and if they are not good enough, think about 
“what we could do differently,” make necessary changes to the training data set, or to aspects 
of the algorithm’s hyperparameters, i.e. the parameters used to control the learning process.  
Altering hyperparameters may include for example, changing the learning rate (the rate at 
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which the machine learns newly acquired information from data) or the batch size (the number 
of training examples the machine learning algorithm will provide). Obvious then runs the 
algorithm “again and again until it’s good.”174  When the results are good enough, the training 
is complete, and the algorithm is used to produce hundreds of images.  After which, Obvious 
select a number of works to form part of their series and decide how to present the work. For 
example, by selecting to frame the works, or even to add an algorithmic signature in the corner, 
as in the case of Edmond de Belamy.  Fautrel estimates that the time taken from the “first 
discussion” of the project to the final creation is around six months.175 
 
D. I AM AI 
Taryn Southern is a singer-songwriter (with prior appearances on American Idol) but 
admits she does not have a “traditional musical background.”176  In 2017, singer Southern 
released, I AM AI.177  The album received press attention for being the “world’s first album 
composed and produced by an AI.”178  While the lyrics and vocal melodies on the album were 
produced by Southern alone, the instrumental musical composition was produced by Southern 
and Amper Music — a machine learning algorithm.  The album’s featured single, Break Free, 
can be listened to on YouTube.179  In this case study, we are focusing on the instrumental 
musical compositions in I AM AI excluding the lyrics and vocal melodies (both separate works 
undeniably copyrightable by Southern).   
 
Amper Score (the successor to Amper Music) is an algorithm that claims to enable 
individuals to create music in “just eight clicks.”180  The Amper Score application is pre-trained, 
thus enabling individuals without coding abilities to create tracks.  After telling the algorithm 
how long the track needs to be, and the structure of the track (e.g. how long should the intro 
be, when should the outro begin, where is the climax of the track), the musician tells the 
algorithm what genre to compose in (pop? hip hop?), what sub-genre to use (dance? 
corporate?), what mood to compose in (care-fee? celebratory?), and what instruments to use 
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(e.g. strings? percussion?).181  Figure 7 below shows part of the decision tree through which 
Amper’s users must navigate. After clicking “create,” the machine will produce a first draft of 
the track. After which the operator can make various edits (such as changing the key, or 
individually editing the instruments used).  
 
 
Figure 7: Amper Score 
 Southern describes the process of creating music through Amper as “similar to the 
process of working with another human being.”182  She started each track of I AM AI by making 
a series of decisions (e.g., BPM, rhythm, key etc.), then essentially giving the A.I. “feedback” 
on the possibilities it generated.  The back and forth continued until Southern was “happy with 
the overall song.”183  This, Southern explains, was not what one might call a hard task, but 
was “time intensive.”184  It is “not like you just press a button and a beautiful song is created,”185 
Southern explains, because there is a certain amount of “decision making by the human”186 
(although the A.I. generates the initial possibilities from which the human makes choices).  As 
a result, Southern calls the process somewhat “editorial” in nature.187 The benefit of using 
Amper, from Southern’s point of view, is that using A.I. allows her greater “control over the 
creative process.”188  When working with hired musicians, more of the decision making is 
outside Southern’s control, whereas working with Amper allowed Southern to be involved in 
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the work’s generation “from inception to completion.”189  
 
 Southern initially became interested in the use of A.I. to overcome a “production 
challenge.”190  Southern, like many other artists, needed to find backing tracks but often found 
the process timely consuming and expensive.  Amper was designed to overcome such 
challenges. Amper CEO, Drew Silverstein, has a background not in engineering, but in 
classical music.  Silverstein worked as a composer of film music but quickly realized 
filmmakers were constrained in their ability to pay for such music. 191  After spotting this 
problem, Siliverstein created Amper to make the production of music quicker and easier for 
such users. While some artists, like Southern, use Amper to produce backing tracks for 
commercially available pop music, the applications extend further.  Bloggers, documentary 
filmmakers, podcasters, game-makers, all can create their own tracks, quickly and efficiently, 
without needing to license pre-existing tracks.  The “ability to create music on my own,” 
Southern says, is “incredibly empowering”192.  Had she had this option at age nineteen or 




This Part analyzes the case studies.  Section A provides a taxonomy of choices made 
by the creators in the case studies which may be understood as “creative.”  Those creative 
choices are referred to as “input choices,” “training choices,” and “output choices.”   Section B 
then turns to the question of whether the works would pass the originality threshold in the U.S., 
E.U., and U.K.  The conclusion of Section B is that, if the works were to be litigated or 
challenged in court, there is a high probability that each would display sufficient creativity to 
pass the originality threshold and thus be eligible for copyright protection.  
 
A. Taxonomy of Creative Choices 
Many of the creators made creative “input choices.”  This term refers to choices 
regarding what data to feed into the machine learning algorithm to enable the work’s creation.  
This may be further subdivided into “conceptual input” choices and “training data” choices. 
“Conceptual input” choices are choices about the nature of the work (i.e., the work’s concept) 
                                               
189 Id.  
190 Id.   
191 Mark Hogan, Artificial Intelligence: Music’s Next Frontier … The Drew Silverstein 
Interview, HOT PRESS (Aug. 2019), https://www.hotpress.com/music/artificial-intelligence-
musics-next-frontier-drew-silverstein-interview-22786307.  
192 Id.  





and the execution of that concept. For example, in 1 the Road, Goodwin made a series of 
conceptual choices.  Goodwin chose to pay homage to Kerouac’s On the Road by creating a 
“car-written” novel documenting a trip from New York to New Orleans.  Completing this 
conceptual vision required the machine learning algorithm to interact with its external 
environment.  To that end, Goodwin chose to feed the machine with information from a GPS 
device, a surveillance camera, a clock, and a microphone.  These choices were not utilitarian 
or functional, but were made because this information would facilitate the production of the 
ultimate artistic work.  Of course, conceptual choices such as these raise the issue of 
copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy.194 Some of Goodwin’s conceptual choices may be 
related to an unprotectable idea rather than a creative expression of that idea.  Nevertheless, 
while the general idea of a “car-written novel” may be unprotectable, the precise manner of 
executing that idea — through the exact route devised by Goodwin and the types of sensors 
attached to the car — are likely to move into the territory of protectable expression.  Further 
to these creative conceptual choices, Goodwin made a series of “training data choices.” This 
term refers to the data upon which the machine learning algorithm must be trained. In 
Goodwin’s case, he chose to train the algorithm on science fiction literature and “bleak” 
literature (as opposed to perhaps the more obvious choice of beatnik literature).  Once again, 
these were aesthetically driven choices. Goodwin not only felt that beatnik literature would be 
“too on the nose,” but also wanted the machine to have “the brain of a painter,” and to that 
end, solicited recommendations regarding bleak literature from a painter that he admired.195  
 
A second category of creative choice may be understood as creative “training choices.”  
These are choices about the operation of the machine learning algorithm.  This includes 
choices about the algorithm’s hyperparameters such as learning rate (the rate at which the 
machine learns newly acquired information from data) and batch size (the number of training 
examples the machine learning algorithm will provide), as discussed by Obvious Art.  This 
category of choices has a clear possibility to be utilitarian or functional, rather than creative.  
Nevertheless, two arguments suggest that some training choices can be considered creative.  
First, Pierre Fautrel analogizes the process of training an algorithm to the process a painter 
undergoes when standing in front of a canvas.196  In both cases, the creator tries different 
techniques and approaches until the tools yield a result of sufficient aesthetic quality.  Second, 
a significant amount of artistic endeavor involves choices about the mechanical operation of 
the tools or instruments which, nevertheless, would be routinely considered creative.  For 
                                               
194 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
195 Goodwin Interview, supra note 120. 





example, a guitarist may tune her guitar strings in different configurations to enable her to 
create a particular type of musical work (while “standard tuning” is the most common guitar 
tuning, “drop D tuning” is common in rock and metal, and “DADGAD tuning” is common in 
Celtic and folk music).197  So long, therefore, as changing hyperparameters is performed in 
order to improve the aesthetic of the finished product, such choices could be considered 
“creative.”  On this point, however, it should be noted that this was the most under-explored 
topic in the interviews. As the conclusion points out, further research on the nature of these 
choices could be significant from a doctrinal perspective. 
  
Lastly, the case studies also demonstrate a variety of creative “outcome choices.” 
These are choices about the selection and presentation of outputs produced by the machine 
learning algorithm.  The creators frequently made selection choices regarding what outputs of 
the machine learning algorithm to include in the final work.  For example, Roslyn Helper 
explains that part of her editorial process involved sifting through the content produced and 
subtracting some elements of text in order to create a sense of narrative.  Likewise, once the 
algorithm is trained, Obvious Art use the algorithm to produce multiple outputs, and then select 
some of those outputs to appear in the final series (just as Edmond de Belamy was an output 
in the La Familie de Belamy series).  Similarly, aesthetic choices must be made about how to 
present the work, including potentially whether any modifications are required.  For example, 
Obvious Art made a creative modification to Edmond de Belamy by adding the string of code 
to the work to indicate the nature of the work as created via machine learning.  An interesting 
question, outside the scope of the current study, is to what extent creative outcome choices 
on their own will merit copyright protection.  This is similar to the question of the copyrightability 
of Objet Trouvés (i.e. found objects).198  The question, however, is not directly posed by the 
works studied here.  
 
B. Copyrightability 
Having categorized the types of creative choices made by the creators in the case 
studies, we turn to the copyrightability question.  The question posed here is whether the 
precise choices made by the creators would be sufficient to pass the originality threshold in 
the U.S., E.U. and U.K. 
  
1. 1 the Road 
In producing 1 the Road, Goodwin made creative input choices.  As highlighted earlier, 
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those involved choices about the work’s concept (a “car-written” novel), the execution of that 
concept (the sensors feeding information to the algorithm), and the data the algorithm was 
trained upon (science fiction and bleak literature).  However, the work involved less substantial 
outcome choices.  Once the algorithm produced the text, no further edits were made to that 
text. Similarly, it is not clear whether Goodwin made any explicitly creative training choices.  
Undoubtedly, Goodwin spent significant time and effort creating the algorithm and this 
involved testing the algorithm using validation data to ensure the quality of output. However, 
it did not clearly emerge from the interview that the operation of the algorithm was altered for 
purely aesthetic reasons.  As noted above and below, this is an area for future research and 
investigation.  While it is possible Goodwin made creative choices which simply did not emerge 
in the interview, we shall assume for the moment that no such choices were made. 
 
Does the absence of creative training and output choices provide a bar to 
copyrightability in the case of 1 the Road?  In the author’s view, this would likely not bar 
copyrightability in the jurisdictions studied. In all of the jurisdictions considered here, originality 
is binary matter: the work is either original or it is not.199  If the putative author can prove that 
the work involved some aspect of the work involved a “modicum” of creativity under U.S. law, 
or was the “author’s own intellectual creation” under E.U./U.K. law, then the work will be 
considered original, even if in other respects originality was not present.  A non-A.I. example 
in this regard may come from photography.  The individual who devises a concept for a 
photograph and selects appropriate scenery may be the copyright holder, even though she 
made no creative decisions about how the camera functioned and made no further selection 
or modification to the camera’s outputs.200 In this context, if Goodwin’s input choices were 
sufficient to pass the originality threshold, then the work will be original even in the absence 
of any training or output choices.  
 
The copyrightability of a literary work whose claim to originality is grounded solely in 
the presence of creative input choices would likely be a novel issue in U.S. law.  Accordingly, 
there is no certainty regarding whether such works would be protected by a court or not.  
Nevertheless, there is at least a very strong argument that the work would receive protection 
and that Goodwin would be deemed the author of the resulting work.  The standard of creativity 
is, according to the Supreme Court, “extremely low.”201  This is demonstrated in the area of 
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literary works by virtue of the fact that many works involving low originality are considered 
protectable. For example, computer programming code frequently meets the threshold of 
involving sufficient creativity to be a literary work.202  Likewise, technical works, including 
manuals and reference works, which by consensus are deemed less creative, receive 
protection.203  Furthermore, there is no requirement that literary prose be coherent in order to 
receive protection.  Nonsense verse, such as the Lewis Carrol’s Jabberwocky (and even more 
abstract examples), or scat lyrics in jazz (providing appropriately fixed), are copyrightable 
despite not making much “sense.”  The probability is high, therefore, that 1 the Road would 
be considered original. The decision to create a car-written novel, that such work would pay 
homage to Kerouac’s On the Road, that the source material for the work would come from 
science fiction and bleak literature, and that the algorithm would respond to various information 
sources (GPS unit, microphone, camera and clock), together display far more than a 
“modicum” of creativity, which in turn supports the conclusion that 1 the Road is an original 
work of an author, i.e., Ross Goodwin. 
 
We arguably come to the same conclusion when we consider E.U./U.K. law.  In both 
jurisdictions, copyrightability requires the work to be “author’s own intellectual creation” as 
evidenced by “free and creative choices” demonstrating a “personal touch.”204  As noted 
earlier, the C.J.E.U. has found that a string of 11 words could potentially pass this threshold.205  
Against this standard, it is likely that 1 the Road is copyrightable on the basis of Goodwin’s 
input choices.  These choices were clearly free and creative in the sense of not flowing from 
utilitarian concerns.   Furthermore, of all the works studied, this work arguably involves the 
clearest example of a “personal” touch. 1 the Road displays a particularly strong connection 
to Goodwin’s character and personality.  The author-work relationship is reflected in a myriad 
of ways.  The choice to re-create On the Road was an individual decision informed by 
Goodwin’s own tastes in literature.  Thereafter, the choice to train the work on bleak literature 
recommended by a painter whom Goodwin admired formed a personal link between 
Goodwin’s personal history and the ultimate expression.  Likewise, decisions that Goodwin 
made about the route, such as stopping at the reportedly haunted house, were made based 
on Goodwin’s own ideas about what would create an interesting narrative, and subsequently 
these decisions found expression in the text. 206  Even the decision to train the work on science 
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fiction and bleak literature, rather than the more obvious choice of training the algorithm on 
Kerouac or other Beatnik literature, was a rather idiosyncratic (perhaps even quirky) choice.  
Together, one may even go as far to call these decisions “hipster,” in the sense that they are 
somewhat deliberately outside of the cultural mainstream and, at times, eschew the more 
obvious choices.  It is somewhat surprising given the dominant scholarly views surrounding 
machine learning and copyright, but Goodwin’s 1 the Road, comes a lot closer to the ideal of 
“romantic authorship” (i.e. that of a lone genius creator207) than many contemporary 
copyrightable works.  
 
Lastly, it is also clear that 1 the Road involves clear “skill and labor.”  The evidence of 
skill and labor supports the conclusion that Goodwin is the author, to the extent that the skill 
and labor criteria is still relevant under U.K. law (or could potentially be in the future post the 
U.K.’s departure from the E.U.).  The training process clearly involved both skill and labor, as 
did the process of driving the car along the 1000-mile journey.  On the basis of Goodwin’s skill 
and labor, and on the basis of the strong personal connection to the work, it is highly likely that 
1 the Road would not be considered a “computer-generated work” in the U.K. Instead, this 
would likely be considered an original work produced by Goodwin as the author. Of course, at 
this point, one might ask:  Why does this matter? Hypothetically, if the work was deemed to 
be a “computer-generated work” then Goodwin, as the person who trained the machine 
learning algorithm and thereafter used the algorithm to produce the work, would undoubtedly 
be the person who made the necessary “arrangements” for the work’s creation.208  However, 
the finding that this work is not computer-generated, but instead created by Goodwin, is 
important for Goodwin on a personal level.  If the work is human-authored rather than 
“computer-generated,” then Goodwin would receive moral rights protections in the work, and 
not merely economic rights.  
 
2. The Lifestyle of the Richard and Family 
In producing The Lifestyle of the Richard and Family, Helper made both creative input 
and output choices, but arguably no creative training choices (as Swiftkey is a commercially 
available application.  Helper had no opportunity to modify the algorithm or its 
hyperparameters). The input choices began with the decision to create a five character dinner 
party play. The input choices continued into the generation of dialogue.  Helper formed an 
idea about how each sentence of dialogue would start and would trigger the dialogue-
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generation process by entering the first letter of the sentence into the Swiftkey application.  
Much like the conceptual choices made by Goodwin, there is a question mark about the 
application of the idea-expression dichotomy at this point.  The decisions that Helper made 
were certainly creative choices, but were these choices related to an idea rather than to the 
expression of an idea?  This is an area where courts enjoy significant discretion and it is 
accordingly a very difficult to predict how a court would answer the question.  There is, 
nevertheless, an argument that, in starting each sentence of dialogue, Helper made creative 
choices about the expression of the idea (a dinner party play).  
 
While the input choices made by Helper were important, they become more significant 
when coupled with the substantial output choices she made. Such output choices existed on 
two levels.  First, when presented with a menu of words to insert into a sentence, Helper made 
a selection of one out of three. Helper did not consciously make these decisions based on an 
aesthetic judgement, but nor was the choice based on utilitarian or functional concerns.  The 
selection was made intuitively based on what made sense to her in the moment.  When this 
output choice is viewed in tandem with the choice regarding how to start each sentence, it is 
clear that Helper had not insubstantial control over the precise textual dialogue in the play.  
And secondly, once the raw text was generated, that text underwent a significant editorial 
stage in which Helper explicitly removed sentences or parts in order to better create a “sense 
of narrative.”209  This editorial process deepened the control that Helper had over the ultimate 
text.  
 
The presence of creative input and output choices make a strong case that the work 
would pass the U.S. “modicum of creativity” standard and the E.U./U.K. “author’s own 
intellectual creation” standard.  The creative “spark” necessary to achieve copyright in the U.S. 
would arguably be satisfied by Helper’s creative choices when viewed in isolation.210  Arguably 
a sufficient spark of creativity was evident in merely starting each sentence of dialogue in a 
particular way or by selecting one word from a menu of three.  When these choices are not 
viewed in isolation, but in combination, the argument for copyrightability strengthens. The 
combination of these choices, furthermore, helps deepen the “personal” connection between 
Helper and the ultimate work, as required by E.U./U.K. law. In this regard, the terminology 
Helper used to describe the process of word selection, i.e. “vibing it,” is interesting.211  The 
term “vibing” is strongly suggestive of the transmission of feeling or atmosphere (in the sense 
                                               
209 Helper Interview, supra note 136. 
210 Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co,, 499 U.S. 340, 343 (1991). 





of the “vibe” in a room, or a person’s good or bad “vibes”). In “vibing it,” it is likely that Helper 
transmit some of her own characteristics into the text itself.  This is particularly likely when one 
considers that the application had previously trained upon Helper’s own language patterns.  
As an illustration of this latter point, consider the “abstract” section at the end of the play, which 
was created by a friend.  Helper’s friend with the more “out there” personality created a portion 
of the play, and this translated into text which was more sexualized.  The contrast between 
this text, and the text created by the less “out there” personality of Helper, is sharp and 
highlights how much of Helper’s text is connected to her own character.  Of course, this also 
raises interesting questions about joint authorship which we shall not analyze in depth here.  
But there is sufficient evidence to make a prediction that the text written by Helper was her 
own original work and thus is the copyrightable work of Helper, the author.   
 
As the author of the work, Helper would be entitled to economic and moral rights in the 
U.K.  This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the work came together across a 
period of several months (developing from an exploratory phase into a more committed and 
time-consuming project) involving laborious effort. In a case like this, the finding that the work 
is human-generated rather than computer-generated is potentially significant.  If the work was 
deemed computer-generated, and lacking a human author, then the copyright would be 
allocated to the person who made the “arrangements” for the work’s creation.  As Helper did 
not create the Swiftkey algorithm, the question on who made the necessary “arrangements” 
for the work is more complex than in, for example, 1 the Road.  However, the early indications 
are that, should this work be considered “computer-generated,” then Helper would be 
considered the person who made the necessary arrangements.  As highlighted above, L.J. 
Jacob in Nova tied the concept of “arrangements” to the concept of originality (by asking who 
contributed skill and labour of an artistic kind).  In this case, it would seem very likely that 
Helper, rather than the Microsoft programmers, have contributed that necessary originality.212  
 
3. Edmond de Belamy 
In one respect, Edmond de Belamy involved the most creativity of all the of the works 
studied here.  Unlike the other works, this work involved the full spectrum of creative choices, 
including creative input choices, training choices, and output choices.  In creating the work, 
Obvious Art made both conceptual training choices and choices as to the training data.  
Obvious not only selected classical portraiture as the genre, but also the portraits that would 
make up their training set (including pairing down the initial data set of 20,000 portraits to 
14,000).  Creative training choices were made to the algorithm’s hyperparameters to ensure 
                                               





the outcomes were “good” from an artistic point of view (the process which Fautrel analogizes 
to a painter before a canvas).  Thereafter, from the outputs created, Obvious selected certain 
works to be part of the series and, in the case of Edmond de Belamy, modified it with the 
algorithmic signature.  
 
As with the prior works, Edmond de Belamy would likely be an original work in the 
jurisdictions studied in this Article.  As the preceding paragraph shows, the work involved a 
very full set of creative choices at all stages of the work’s generation.  The result is that 
Obvious Art had a very significant degree of control over the ultimate work.  This would seem 
sufficient to pass the “modicum” of creativity necessary under U.S. law, where relatively 
modest photographs and drawings routinely receive copyright protection.  These free and 
creative choices also help demonstrate the creators’ personal touch, under E.U. / U.K. law.  
As highlighted earlier, Obvious selects a subject which “speaks” to them, suggesting a 
personal connection between the authors and the output.213  Furthermore, Obvious describes 
their artistic goal as to “explore, use, and share the different ways machine learning algorithms 
can catalyze our natural creativity.”214  Arguably the choice of portraiture (a staple of natural 
human creativity) and the choices made in execution of that concept, furthered their self-
selected mission and helped forge a personal connection to the work.  Likewise, to the extent 
that skill and labor is still relevant under U.K. law, the creation process (approximately six 
months in duration) and manually cleaning the data set shows a significant amount of labor.   
 
An interesting question, not fully explored in the interview, is how joint authorship 
principles may apply in a case like this.  In the case of Edmond de Belamy, the most likely 
outcome is that the three members of Obvious Art were joint authors of the work.  But, in order 
to be joint authors, each of the collective must contribute original expression to the work.215  
This would not be the case if, for example, one member of the group confined their role to 
purely technical endeavors (e.g., creating the machine learning algorithm and training it upon 
the data selected by others).  In such a scenario, the technician in the group would not be an 
author, and not entitled to copyright (in the absence of a contractual agreement).  In this 
current case, the three individuals each performed an artistic or aesthetic role in the 
construction of the work; each for example, contributed to the conceptual design of Edmond 
de Belamy, to selecting the training data, and to deciding what outputs were sufficiently “good.”  
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It is therefore likely that each of the trio would be considered an author contributing original 
expression to the work.  Nevertheless, the scenario does point to an interesting question for 
the future: When will certain contributions to a group machine learning project be considered 
creative, and when will such contributions be viewed as merely technical?216  
 
4. I AM AI 
Lastly, I AM AI demonstrated creative input and creative output choices, much like The 
Lifestyle of the Richard and Family.  The creative input choices were conceptual in nature and 
included telling the algorithm how long the track needs to be, the structure of the track, the 
genre and sub-genre, the mood and the instruments to use.  Clearly Southern had an “idea” 
about how the track ought to sound, but the choices involved here (e.g. length, structure etc.) 
related to the expression of that idea rather than merely the idea itself.  As a pre-trained 
software, Southern did not make any creative training data input choices nor creative training 
choices.  But she did make creative output choices.  When the algorithm produced output 
tracks, Southern edited those tracks, for example, by changing the key, or individually editing 
the instruments used.  
Once again, these are likely to be free and creative choices, sufficient to pass either 
the “author’s own intellectual creation” standard of the E.U., or the “modicum” of creativity 
standard of the U.S.  What is particularly interesting about I AM AI, however, is the potential 
division between creativity and labor that it presents.  On one hand, the work is highly creative.  
The advantage of using Amper was, according to Southern, the control this provided to her 
over the production process.  If Southern worked with human musicians to create the track, 
she may lose a certain amount of control over the work.  By using Amper, Southern retained 
almost complete control over the ultimate work and this afforded her the opportunity to make 
the type of free and creative choices which would demonstrate her personality.  On the other 
hand, one could argue that using Amper reduced the amount of labor required to produce the 
compositions.  The unique selling point of Amper (and similar applications) is that it enables 
individuals to create musical compositions, even if those individuals are not skilled 
instrumentalists, and in a fraction of the time that traditional musical composition requires.  Of 
course, it is important not to overstate this point.  Southern still describes the process of 
creating the works as “time intensive”217 and even under the old U.K. “skill and labor” standard, 
the amount of labor required was minimal.218  Nevertheless, I AM AI presents an interesting 
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example of a work, much like conceptual art, where creativity may be high, while labor may 
be low (relative to similar works in the same genre).  
 
Of all the works studied, I AM AI presents the most interesting questions regarding the 
initial allocation of copyright ownership.  As demonstrated, it is likely that Southern contributed 
originality to the work, and thus not only is the work copyrightable but Southern is an author 
of the work and entitled to the initial allocation of rights.  However, is Southern the sole author 
of I AM AI?  In this case, it would seem possible for the programmers to claim that they also 
contributed some originality to the resulting work (on the grounds that they built the library of 
tones and instruments in Amper and created an interface which constrained and channeled 
the creative choices of Southern).  Under U.S. law, this raises the question that Ginsburg and 
Budiardjo perceive as the most appropriate and difficult question in the topic, i.e., how to 
allocate ownership of copyright when both programmers and users of algorithms contribute 
some creativity to the ultimate work?219  This same question is relevant in both E.U. and U.K. 
law, and, should the work be considered “computer-generated” in the U.K., the question 
persists albeit in slightly different linguistic formulation (i.e., courts in this instance would likely 
ask who made the necessary “arrangements” for the work — Southern or Amper’s 
programmers?).  
 
We need not resolve this question fully here.  The primary research question is whether 
the case studied works are eligible for copyright in the first instance, which I AM AI likely is on 
the grounds that Southern’s contribution likely qualifies the album’s instrumental compositions 
as “original works of authorship.”  But it is worth speculating on what may happen if Amper’s 
programmers have also contributed some original expression to the work.  One obvious option 
is that, in such a case, Southern and Amper’s programmers are joint-authors of the work and 
thus joint owners.220 However, this is not a forgone conclusion, as particularly U.S. law requires 
an intention to co-author.221  It is not clear whether a court would find such an “intention” when 
the participants have had no direct interaction with one another.  But nor can it be said that 
there are two separable copyright works that simply exist side by side, because the originality 
of the programmers and Southern is significantly interwoven into one final product.222  It is 
likely therefore, that courts would need to develop new doctrine in such a case to appropriately 
allocate ownership.  Ginsburg and Budiardjo propose a framework which courts could 
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All of the works studied in this Article involved a series of creative choices. In each case, 
the ultimate work is heavily determined by the decisions of a human creator.  Accordingly, 
they each stand a high chance of passing the originality threshold and receiving copyright 
protection in the U.S., E.U. and U.K.  This conclusion is significant for the individuals in the 
study, who are likely to be able to claim copyright’s economic and moral rights. But it also 
holds significance for legal scholars and courts.  The case studies suggest that many works 
produced using the current set of machine learning tools will receive copyright protection.  This 
in turn suggests that some literature may under estimate the amount of human creativity 
involved in producing works of machine learning, and over-estimate the incidence of purely 
machine created works. It also provides further support for a less dominant view in the 
literature (particularly the work of Grimmelmann, Ginsburg and Budiardjo) that there are not 
yet any truly computer-authored works.  In particular, the studies here chime with Ginsburg 
and Budiardjo’s observation that “the most technologically advanced machines of our era are 
little more than faithful agents of the humans who design or use them.”224 
 
This conclusion is made despite the limitations of the study.  As demonstrated by the 
study itself, works produced via machine learning are highly heterogenous.  There is a great 
diversity of works produced by machine learning.  In this case, the author studied works 
produced by individuals who explicitly think of themselves as artists or creators.  There are, 
naturally, a range of works which are produced by individuals who do not think of themselves 
as artists and do not consider themselves as engaging in an artistic process.  Examples of 
works in this category may involve an individual who uses a translation software to translate 
a court decision or an individual who uses software to randomly generate a sequence of 
words.  But the existence of A.I. works that do not involve creativity, do not detract from the 
central point highlighted by these case studies and this Article: that there is significant room 
for creativity within the field of machine learning works and that many such works will qualify 
for protection under traditional principles.  
 
The conclusion that such works are largely copyrightable may change if courts modify 
the requirements for copyrightability.  As noted earlier, there is currently no formal “causal” 
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connection requirement between author and resulting work.225  Likewise, the concept of 
“authorship” does not have a particularly robust standalone definition, but is often a label 
attached to the person who supplies the necessary originality.226  Some scholars have 
attempted to deduce principles of causality and authorship, and made interesting arguments 
about how such concepts could fit within formal legal doctrine;227 but so far courts have not 
clearly endorsed those views.  However, if courts were to adopt these scholarly theories, and 
articulate more substantive concepts of authorship and causality, then more questions could 
be raised about the copyrightability of the case studies.  In particular, the unpredictable nature 
of the algorithms’ outputs may result in claims that the relevant creators were not the relevant 
“cause” or the “author” of the works.  This line of questioning becomes even more pressing if 
we consider the idea-expression dichotomy.  Even if we assume the creators supply originality, 
in the sense of free and creative choices, there is the possibility (on display to a degree in the 
case studies228) that such choices relate to the idea behind the work, rather than the 
expression of the idea; one may argue that the precise expression of the idea is more 
attributable to the unpredictability of the algorithm.  Nonetheless, my prediction is that, should 
courts develop the causation or authorship concepts further, the creators of the works studied 
here would still qualify as authors of the works.  This conclusion flows from the fact that the 
creators enjoy a high level of control over the aesthetic nature of expression in the resulting 
works. But of course, such a conclusion would depend on the precise nature of the causation 
or authorship concepts that courts endorse.   
 
The conclusions of this study call into question the need for bespoke legal regimes to 
ensure the protection of machine learning works, such as that found in the U.K.  The works 
studied here are likely to be suitable candidates for copyright on normative grounds. Copyright 
is a tool for incentivizing a certain type of public goods (i.e., creative works),229 and also 
provides protection for natural rights in works of authorship.230  While this Article has not 
focused on copyright theory, it seems likely that the works studied in the case studies are 
works which should be incentivized as a matter of policy, and where the creators may have 
legitimate natural rights claims.  The finding that these works are likely to receive copyright 
protection under traditional copyright principles is accordingly interesting.  This finding 
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suggests that those works which deserve copyright protection, are likely to receive it under 
the existing law.  The danger presented by the U.K.’s specific legal regime is that, rather than 
shore up the copyrightability of works that deserve protection, it merely extends protection to 
a class of works which do not deserve protection.  If the provision extends protection to works 
which would not pass the traditional originality threshold, it potentially extends protection to 
works which ought to be in the public domain. 
 
The study here also demonstrates the need for further empirical research into machine 
learning and creativity.  In particular, further research of an empirical nature, ought to be 
conducted into the specific sub-categories of creative work.  This Article has begun the 
empirical analysis by studying one literary work, one dramatic work, one artistic work, and one 
musical work.  Future studies could focus on any one of these categories alone.  This would 
be particularly beneficial to demonstrate the full range of creativity that is involved in machine 
learning works.  By focusing on literary works, for example, researchers could document and 
analyze works which fall on both ends of a spectrum, from the highly creative (such as 1 the 
Road) to the minimally creative (such as the translated text example).  Similarly, further 
empirical work ought to be undertaken to consider the impact of training choices on the 
ultimate work.  To what extent is changing an algorithm’s hyperparameters an artistic 
endeavor undertaken to produce an aesthetic result is a question requiring further data 
gathering.  
 
The theoretical questions posed by this study are also very significant.  We have so far 
bracketed questions about derivative works and potential copyright infringement.  This study 
operated on the basis that the works studied were not derivative of their underlying source 
material.  That assumption could be questioned. To what extent does creating a work via an 
algorithm, which has been trained on earlier works, create an infringing derivative work?  Or 
to what extent does the idea/expression dichotomy, the substantial similarity doctrine, or fair 
use, apply to ensure that such resulting works are non-infringing?  
 
Similarly, more research will be required on the policy implications of machine learning 
and creativity.  This Article has focused on a group of works for which copyright would, 
arguably, be normatively justifiable (to the extent that copyright is ever normatively desirable).  
An interesting example in this regard is the new GPT-2 algorithm.231  GPT-2 is an algorithm 
                                               







by Open-AI which allows large scale text generation.232  The algorithm has both a pre-trained 
version and a version that can be trained by oneself. Intriguingly, Goodwin states that if he 
were to create 1 the Road again, he would do so with the GPT-2 algorithm rather than his own 
created software, because of its superior text-creation process.233  Open-AI have been 
cautious in their release of the algorithm to the public.  Their stated concern is that individuals 
could use the software to create large amounts of “fake news” text.234  However, such 
algorithms also pose intriguing questions for copyright policy.  If large amounts of text can be 
generated very quickly, should those resulting works be eligible for copyright?  There would 
seem to be no market failure relating to such works, and presumably the answer is that 
providing copyright in such cases does not further the stated policy goals of copyright law.  
More thorough analysis of the policy implications of copyrightability of such works would be 
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